Nuclear Deterrence, Game Theory, and a non-Review Review (A House of Dynamite)

The Man Who Saved The World

Vasily Arkhipov. That’s a man often credited, without exaggeration, for saving the world. On 27th Oct 1962, at the peak of Cuban Missile Crisis and during the Cold War between US and USSR, the two nations came closest to a nuclear war, and were averted due to the actions of Arkhipov.

Vasily Arkhipov was a senior officer in the Soviet nuclear submarines at the time. The year before, in July 1961, while he was onboard a Soviet (nuclear-powered and nuclear-equipped) submarine doing some tests near Greenland, it developed a major radiation leak. The radio communication broke down too, and the crew had to devise a solution at that time on their own. They did. At the cost of major radiation exposure to all 139 crew members, with 22 of them dying within 2 years. There’s definitely a thrilling movie, if not a Chernobyl like series, in there somewhere.

On 27th Oct 1962, Arkhipov was in another nuclear submarine (B-59), hidden well below somewhere in the Caribbean. Meanwhile, a US spy plane had been shot down over Cuba by a Soviet missile.

A US Submarine (USS Beale) detected the B-59 and exploded ‘depth charges’ at Arkhipov’s submarine to signal (through low-power non-destructive blasts around the submarine’s position) it to surface. The US submarine was joined by an aircraft carrier too.

The Soviet B-59 carried a nuclear payload of 15 kilotons (about the size of the bomb on Hiroshima). Given the shooting down of the US spy plane and attack on the B-59, the team inside the submarine suspected a possible breakout of WW3 on the ground. Their communication was, again, cut off from their command centre and it only served to increase that tension.

B-59 targeted its nuclear torpedo against the aircraft carrier. It had three main crew members, and the launch required the consent of all three (in other Soviet Submarines of the time, it required the consent of two main crew members). Two of the crew members, including the commander, were convinced to launch it. Thankfully, Vasily Arkhipov had a calmer predisposition, and vetoed the decision.

A nuclear strike from a Soviet Submarine against a US aircraft carrier would’ve almost certainly led to another World War less than two decades from the end of the previous one.

Game Theory, Nuclear Deterrence, and Information Signalling

John von Neumann, one of the smartest humans to have ever lived on Earth, created impacts across fields (economics, areas of pure maths and statistics, computer sciences, physics), birthed entire new disciplines (game theory, a certain kind of computer architecture), and was a key figure on the Manhattan Project (to invent the atom bomb).

As part of game theory, and nuclear strategy, he (and others) figured that if just one nation has the nuclear weapons, they may dominate the world order. But, if two adversarial nations do, there’s a rational nuclear deterrence between them, such that they both know an attack by one will be countered. And given the potential destruction caused by nuclear weapons, it escalates to ‘mutually assured destruction’ (MAD). Thus, to avoid self-destruction, both the adversarial nuclear nations would be deterring each other from nuclear first use.

‘Second-strike capability’ (ability to launch nuclear weapons after being attacked first) is a key nuclear strategy too, arising from the same ideas. If you don’t have a credible second-strike ability, the adversary is incentivised to make a deep destructive cut in their first attempt. Second-strike capability is also the reason why, some argue, nations don’t stop at just a couple of nuclear weapons but stockpile them to large quantities instead.

Steven Pinker’s Book on Common Knowledge

Steven Pinker is a pretty cool cognitive psychologist, linguist, and public intellectual at large, writing very popular and accessible books on how the human mind works, how language works (if we have a ‘grammar template’ of sorts we’re born with that all grammar broadly fits into), how we learn things etc. His YouTube lectures and speeches, especially around language and grammar are great fun to watch.

He’s recently come out with a book (“When Everyone Knows That Everyone Knows . . .: Common Knowledge and the Mysteries of Money, Power, and Everyday Life”) that’s centred on the concept of ‘common knowledge’. Ideas around where both/all parties know something, and both parties know that the other party knows that information, and know that the other party knows that they know (to infinity).

(I haven’t read the book but have heard Pinker on his various podcast appearances.)

A few examples would be:

• Reason why we drive on the side of the road that we do — it’s a rule but it’s also that I know that the other person would be coming from this direction, and they know I would be arriving from this other direction

• Why there are a certain set of ‘social lies’ that we tell each other out of politeness (“Oh your line of work is interesting; tell me more”, “I really liked your article”) or even if we don’t like small talk, it’s often better than the alternate. In the case of polite social lies, there’s a slim chance that it might actually be true; in the latter small talk, we like that the other person is interested in us for more than just the agenda item but actually wants to engage (even if they do so by talking about the weather).

• Same goes for sexual innuendos, veiled bribes (“thoda chai-paani ke liye/bacchon ki mithai”, only for some tea-biscuits/sweets for the kids) and threats (“It’ll be a shame if something were to happen to that beautiful wife of yours”). I know I am making the bribe or the threat, and you know I am making it, but it is still not ‘out in the open’. There’s a plausible deniability.

And the common knowledge concept about a given nation’s nuclear capabilities relates to nuclear deterrence too.

India, e.g., needs to not just have a nuclear triad (ability to use nuclear weapons from land, sea, and air) but others need to know that India has the nuclear triad for it to have the deterrence value. India will also want to reveal just the right information to not compromise the security of the second-strike in itself.

A House of Dynamite — Not A Review

In Oct ‘25, Netflix released Kathyrn Bigelow’s A House of Dynamite and I saw it yesterday. A two line premise is:

A single unidentified intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) has been launched and is heading to US. What are the responses and what’s the decision-making process of those in charge (Defence forces, security advisors, US President).

I really really enjoyed the movie. I enjoyed it at two levels — for the cinematic aspects (editing, narrative structure, tension-building) and for the in-world aspects (weaving game theory and signalling, how they treat information ambiguity).

A House of Dynamite — Movie Poster (from Wikipedia)

****** mild spoilers ahead (skip if you’re extremely sensitive about it) ******

A key issue they grapple with is the fact that they don’t know who is responsible for the launch of the ICBM or its potential impact, and they’re discussing launching a counterattack immediately (as against waiting for more time, information etc.).

I know some people had an issue with that (and with one other major spoilery issue that I don’t intend to engage with here). But, this makes sense at two levels — it’s a very short duration (~20 mins) from the detection of the ICBM to it potentially hitting US. It’s understandable for such situations to result in a certain kind of panicky decision-making and not necessarily aligned with long-term thinking. I suspect Arkhipov-like calmer position is harder with a lot of people around, especially as the louder voices tend to be reinforcing the hawkish position while the doveish position requires a bit more calmer thought.

There’s this other issue that other countries, e.g. Russia, don’t know what US knows. Thus, they don’t know if US would arrive at the incorrect conclusion of Russia being responsible for this act or not. So they don’t even know if US would launch a weapon against Russia. And thus, Russia would mobilise its arsenal. And US would see that as a signal that Russia is involved in this and preparing for a follow-through attack, leading to an escalating spiral.

I also particularly like the narrative choice of showing what the various protagonists were doing, deciding, or discussing during the pivotal period, and that’s helped by the excellent editing.

*******************Spoilers End *******************

Ram Gopal Varma when asked about how he got such authenticity in his movies like Satya and Company, responded by asking the reporter if they’ve been in the underworld to know if the movie was authentic or not. Satya and Company, per RGV, just fit into our conception of what the Mumbai mafia might’ve behaved like.

I am not aware of military terminologies nor have I been anywhere close to US defence but this fit into my conception of authenticity and I liked how they neither ‘dumb-it-down’ the technicalities nor alienated them with its over-use.

Someone who had recommended this on a Whatsapp group, made a comparison with 12 Angry Men (or Ek Ruka Hua Faisla in Hindi) and I thought that was a very interesting one. The process they use in this movie for moving ahead is such fun and so thrillingly done.

If some of these topics are of interest, I strongly recommend the movie. And if they’re not but you found what I wrote to be of mild interest, you’ll definitely like the movie more.

Footnotes:

1. “Thank you Vasili Arkhipov, the man who stopped nuclear war,” from Guardian (Oct 27, 2012)

2. “Horror of Soviet Nuclear Sub’s ’61 Tragedy Told,” from LATimes (3 Jan 1994)